A Dynamical Similarity Approach to the Foundations of Complexity and
  Coordination in Multiscale Systems by Rej, Abhijnan
ar
X
iv
:q
-b
io
/0
40
30
26
v1
  [
q-
bio
.N
C]
  1
8 M
ar 
20
04
A Dynamical Similarity Approach to the
Foundations of Complexity and Coordination
in Multiscale Systems1
Abhijnan Rej
Department of Mathematics
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06269–3009
rej@math.uconn.edu
1A University Scholar Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments of the Bachelor of Arts (Mathematics) degree as University Scholar at Uni-
versity of Connecticut in August 2003.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Order and its generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 The control paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 The coordination paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Non-reductionism and touchstones for multiscale coordination 3
2 Defining Complexity 7
2.1 Complex systems? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 The inference chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 The action chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Scale, Measurement and the System/Subsystem Distinction 15
3.1 Epistemology vs. ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 System/susbsystem dichotomy and self-reflexivity . . . . . . . 16
4 Free Parameters and “Tight Models” 18
5 Formal Similitude and Dynamical Similarity 21
5.1 Allometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 Formal similitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3 Principle of dynamical similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4 Predictions from dynamical similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6 Conclusion 27
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Order and its generation
The study of purposive activity of the central nervous system can be reduced
to the search for answers to two complimentary problems. The first problem
is that of coordination which is, roughly, the following: inorder to satisfy
everyday demands, an animal routinely “brings together” segments of its
body with one another and with the surrounding layout of surfaces (Turvey,
1990) The resultant movements (when they are thus generated) are ordered
in space and time, even though they arise due to very many microscopic
ensembles (neurons, neuromuscular elements, tissues, . . . ) acting within,
and upon, one another. The second problem is the problem of control : it
is the problem of regulation of purposive (i.e., voluntary) action such that
it satisfies the constraints imposed by a given goal. When elaborated, the
problem of control includes all actions by any arbitrary (natural or artificial)
system that is goal-directed. This is, then, the problem of cybernetics. One
can, therefore, see the problem of pruposive activity reducing to the study
of order (coordination) and its generation (control) in sufficiently complex
systems.
1.2 The control paradigm
The two complementary problems have led to two disparate groups of theo-
ries and approaches. Approaches to the problem of control are, historically,
older than the approaches to the problem of coordination (at least in the
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modern sense of the term.) The simplest approach to the problem of con-
trol is evoking some higher (structural) unit of the central nervous system,
the central pattern generator, (for example, in the cortex) which generates
commands for the execution of purposive action. These commands are then
transmitted to the organ that is to physically “carry out” the action (e.g.,
limbs) via the remaining neural mechanisms whose roles are precisely to do
the same (Gelfand et.al., 1971). This view of control stems from the classical
work of Fritsch and Hitzig and manifests itself fully in the work of Sherring-
ton, Pavlov and others. In more modern terminology, one sees this central
pattern generator as being a motor program (Keele, 1968.) A motor program,
like a computer program, is often seen as a symbol string where “the sym-
bols are commands that, when executed by the neuromuscular apparatus,
dictate particular patterns of muscular activity that . . . produce a desired
movement” (Riley & Turvey, 2001.)
1.3 The coordination paradigm
Approaches to the problem of coordination are more recent, and involve
viewing systems that exhibit coordination (the so-called coordinative struc-
tures) as dissipative structures that exist under far-from-equilibrium condi-
tions (Kugler et.al, 1979.) Consequently, under this philosophy, coordinative
structures are modelled using synergetics– typically, an order parameter is
identified that satifies a nonautonomous nonlinear (partial) differential equa-
tion.The basic idea in such approaches is to identify an order parameter that
somehow enfolds in itself the contributions of layers of physiological struc-
tures (neurons, neuromuscular tissues, . . . ). There is no systematic way to
identify the order parameter that maximally encapsulates “useful” informa-
tion about the processes that are to be modelled. The canonical example of
this approach is the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of interlimb coordination.
1.4 Non-reductionism and touchstones for mul-
tiscale coordination
The Haken-Kelso-Bunz model approaches the problem of interlimb coordina-
tion at the level of end-effectors. The order paramter φ is the relative phase
3
of oscillations of the limbs and satifies
dφ
dt
= −
dV
dφ
(1.1)
where V (φ) is the potential function
V (φ) = −A cosφ− B cos 2φ (1.2)
A and B are free parameters (see Haken, Kelso & Bunz, 1984). By the
very nature of this model, one does not gain much information about the
underlying neural processes that coallesce to produce behavior at the level of
the end-effectors (here, the limbs). In order to address this issue and make the
HKB model congruous with some purported dynamical model at the neural
level, Beek, Peper and Daffertshofer (Beek, Peper & Daffertshofer, 2002)
have proposed a two-tiered organization of rhythmic interlimb coordination
that couples dynamical behavior at the level of some (unspecified) neural
substrate to the classical HKB model.Their rationale for adding this new level
of ”neural oscillators” was essentially experimental. The HKB model, as it
stands, fails to account for a number of experimental observations such as the
existence of non-monotonic amplitude-frequency relations (Kay et.al., 1987)
and (phase-dependent) phase shift after perturbation (Kay et.al., 1991).
There are two main reasons why one must attempt to build models that
are multi- and cross- scale.
• Stochasticity Motor control, in general, exhibits piece-wise determin-
ism. In particular, studies have revealed the essentially stochastic na-
ture of fluctuations of the center of pressure during quiet standing (Ri-
ley & Turvey, 2001). Very often, the origin of disorder comes from the
observer-theorist’s ”deliberate refusal to specify (and follow) the loca-
tions and behavior of particles on the microlevel that surround a given
particle and interact with it” (Mineev-Weinstein, 1996). Therefore,
any complete theory of biological coordination that is (at least partly)
stochastic must take into account the multitude of degrees of freedom
at a microscopic level. These microscopic degrees of freedom may be
suppressed in the macroscopic analysis; one can conjecture that ’noise’
in systems arise due to the so-called ”coarse-graining” of the system
(Tomita, 1984). Noise generally manifests itself as Langevin terms as
in the Fokker-Planck equations of Schoner, Haken and Kelso (1986).
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• Evolutionary holism The most important reason, however, behind look-
ing for a multiscale coordination dynamic is the following: ”large brains
gain their powers not so much by the number of neurons they con-
tain, but by the number of scales of neural organization they support”
(Alexander & Globus, 1996). If one believes that evolution has spent an
apparently inordinately large amount of time trying to solve the prob-
lem of locomotion (Brooks, 1991), then an analysis of interlimb coordi-
nation (instrumental in solving the problem of gait) that is sensitive to
evolutionary history must try to include the various scales of organiza-
tion that may have given us the kind of coordination we observe. The
search of the laws of multiscale coordination, thus, is also in line with
Edward Wilson’s principle of evolutionary holism: ”. . . complex wholes
will usually be developed incrementally over evolutionary time, and
that the various intermediate forms must themselves be whole, robust
systems . . . ” (Clark, 1999).
However, oscillator models that couple scales may fall prey to a version of
morphological reductionism: That is, some (micro)scale of the model is seen
as privileged or fundamental (often some uncharacterized “canonical ensem-
ble” cf. Frank, Daffertshoffer and Beek, 2000) and the remaining scales are
seen to be related in a linear causal fashion to that scale. Additionally,
they tie in various physiological scales of a coordinative agent by introducing
successive layers of oscillators whose introduction have no a´ priori´ legitimiza-
tion.
A theory of multiscale coordination that is to avoid this trap of morpho-
logical reductionism must satisfy two touchstones:
• The theory must address whether the system/subsystem distinction in
its models are an ontological dichotomy or an epistemological necces-
sity, and incorporate the same in its modelling strategy. This is because
of the following reason: morphological reductionism, by definition, as-
serts the existence of elemental structural units. These structures are
seen as primary causal agents. One often identifies these primary struc-
tural units of a given system as its subsystems. The abhorrence of
primary structures, then, neccessarily entail the banishment of the sys-
tem/subsystem dichotomy.
• The theory must incorporate a minimally small set of maximally en-
tailed free parameters in its models. In multiscale coordination, the
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free parameters at each scale must be entailed by free parameters at
other scales.
In this Project, we identify a possible candidate for a non-reductionistic the-
ory of multiscale coordination. The proposed theory obeys the principle of
dynamical similarity– the equations of motion for different scales of physio-
logical organization are ”similiar”. This similarity is formalized through the
notion of topological conjugacy, and following Rosen (1978), we say that the
proposed theory obeys the principle of dynamical similarity.
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Chapter 2
Defining Complexity
2.1 Complex systems?
At the heart of any discussion of how a given mutiscale system with many
components coordinate and control the observed phenomenology lies the
question of the complexity of that system. This is mainly because of a
cultural ’paradigm-shift’ in the natural sciences where any system that is
structurally constituted of very many interacting parts and with cross-scale
interactions is seen as being outside the purview of classical simple systems
that generally mimic the composition of simple Newtonian systems. Indeed,
with the introduction of ideas from nonlinear dynamics to biology, it has
become quite fashionable to assert that the richness of the behavior of bi-
ological systems has something to do with its complexity (cf. Goodwin &
Sole, 2000.) Yet, the very definition of the word ’complexity’ is hard to
come by. In this Chapter, I wish to discuss two approaches to that prob-
lem of complexity, one of computational mechanics (Crutchfield, 1994) and
computational complexity of natural systems (Wolfram, 2002 and Chaitin,
1987), collectively termed as the computational approach, and the other of
impredicative complexity (Rosen 1978, 2001a, 2001b). I will examine the
importance of the two approaches in creating a viable and non-reductionist
theory of multiscale coordination.
The idea that complexity somehow “lies in the eye of the beholder” is a
natural and intuitive notion, one that stems from our everyday usage of the
term. Afterall, we marvel at a chess Grandmaster for easily solving a (chess)
puzzle that seems immensely complex to us. For God, every phenomena, no
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matter how complex, will appear simple– this has been the leading credo of
the classical mechanical view of the Universe as it was seen in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries; recall Laplace saying that with Newton’s equations
of motion, one can view the entire Universe with all its details, as merely
being a clock.
The idea that most nonlinear dynamical systems are sensitively-dependent
on the initial data that is “given” to them has effectively ended the Laplacian
program in science. We now know that even very simple one-dimensional
maps (like the quadratic map studied by Robert May in the early 1970s)
can produce (when the free-parameters in those maps are “tweeked”) a ex-
tremely rich spectra of behavior that ranges from very simple and regular
(limit-cycles) to completely random (chaotic).
However, when we try to summarize and describe the behavior that is
’sandwiched’ between these two extremes, we are often at a loss. Typically,
this “intermediate” part of the spectra exhibits both order and disorder, both
the presence and absence of structure. To qualify this claim, let us look into
Wolfram’s classification scheme for the set of all elementary cellular automata
(ECA). Let us assume that we have run each of the all possible ECA rules
(256 rules) for n steps of evolution.
• Class I = all ECAs that die out.
• Class II = all ECAs that start producing regular and/or self-similiar
behavior that stabilizes and “settle”.
• Class III = all ECAs that exhibit “islands” of structures that are local-
ized, yet these structures are neither homogeneously nor isotropically
distributed.
• Class IV = all ECAs where we cannot detect any structure whatsoever,
i.e., ECAs that are random.
I phrase the Wolfram classification (Wolfram, 1994) in this way for two rea-
sons: (a) this is how the classification was first described, as a sort of a
“visual reaction”, and (b) the very way the classification is described sug-
gests the central theme of this Chapter: will observer X classify a given ECA
in the same way (i.e., put it into the same class) as any other observer Y? In
other words, is there a universal and quantitative characteristic of any given
ECA that is invariant for all observers and allow any two of them to use this
charateristic to classify that ECA into the same class?
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What is being alluded to by the aforementioned question is the notion of
subjectivity1. In order to study this question further, I introduce a ’pictorial’
notational system (the inference chain and action chain) that allows us to
succinctly discuss the results of Crutchfield, 1994, Chaitin, 1987, Wolfram,
2002 and Rosen, 2001a, 2001b in a unified framework. My intention is to
frame the notions of complexity, computation and measurement problems
(both in quantum and classical-chaotical systems) in a single package. The
principle advantage of doing so is to explore the duality of measurement as
inference (Chaitin, 1987 and Wolfram 2002) on one hand and measurement
as action (Crutchfield, 1994 and Rosen, 1978) on the other.
2.2 The inference chain
Some notation: Let {Oi}i∈A be the set of observables, A some index set.
Let {Mj}j∈B be the set of meters, B some other index set. By a meter, I
mean a measurement device that inputs some phenomena and outputs some
charateristic of that phenomena.
In essence a measurement of Oi is infering through Mj certain properties
of Oi. Operationally, what a meter does (when applied to Oi instantenously
at a given region of the Universe) is it gives us a real number that we say is
a measurement of Oi
2. I denote this as:
Oi
input
−−−−→ Mj
output
−−−−−→ r(∈ Q).
Application of Mj to Oi t times will give us a time series. We denote this by
(Oi
input
−−−−→ Mj)
t
output
−−−−−→ {r1, r2, . . . , rt}(:= T ).
I call chains like the ones above inference chains because we use the meter to
infer about the observable. Now, a natural question about inference chains is
the following: given a time-series, what can we say about the observable? In
other words, can we reconstruct the dynamics that Oi obeys on the basis of
1It seems pertinent to mention that the question of classification could be equally
applied to the behavior of continous dynamical systems; indeed, one way to view continous
systems is to view them as ECAs taken to a continuum limit. For example, one can obtain
the Navier-Stokes equations by taking a suitable continuum limit of certain ECAs.
2The methodology of empirical natural sciences largely boil down to choosing suitable
meters that provide us maximal information about Oi
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this time-series? The answer is yes. In the past decade, a number of methods
have been developed that center around Taken’s theorem, and allow us to
reconstruct the geometry of the phase space of Oi from time-series in a one-
to-one sense (Packard et.al., 1980.)
This notation also allows us to abstractly capture the essence of phase
transitions. To see this consider Oi to be a variable such that r ∈ {−1, 1}.
Thus the inference chain is going to be of the form
(Oi
input
−−−−→ Mj)
t output−−−−−→ {−1, 1}t
({−1, 1}t means a t-tuple with entries either −1 or +1. If we obtain a time-
series T = {−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1, . . . , 1, 1, 1, 1, . . .} we say that observable Oi
has undergone a phase transition.
We now introduce another set of objects that I call recognition devices
each denoted by some Rk. These devices input T and sort the observable
from which T is obtained into any of n-bins uniquely. We, at this point,
do not think of these bins as being anything other than placeholders for
observables. In the inference chain notation,
(Oi
input
−−−−→ Mj)
t
output
−−−−−→ T
input
−−−−→ Rk
output
−−−−−→ some bin.
The natural question here is the following: how are we to construct Rk?
One answer is provided by the notion of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity or
algorithmic complexity in general. Chaitin’s construction of Rk will be view-
ing Rk as the shortest algorithm (the program length in bits is the smallest)
that inputs T with its length in bits α and outputs a description of T that
is of length β < α. The bin into which T would be put is, for Chaitin,
uniquely specified by the length of the smallest algorithm that achieves this.
The complexity of T , for Chaitin, is
CT = smallest ♯(Rk)
where ♯(Rk) is the length of Rk such that the description of T (in bits)
provided by inputing T into Rk is shorter than T itself.
Now as Chaitin and others observed, suppose T is random in the sense
that any two ri and rj are statistically independent. Then, the shortest pos-
sible algorithm Rk that outputs a description of T when fed T will be of the
same lenght as ♯Rk. In other words, random time-series are algorithmically
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incompressible. This is one way to define randomness. Algorithmic complex-
ity also allows us to define complexity in a succinct way: if a description of
T that is shorter in length than T itself cannot be obtained by Rk in poly-
nomial time (polynomial in the length of T ), then we say that T is complex.
Wolfram (2002) has conjectured that all Class III and Class IV ECAs are
NP-complete3.
On the other hand, say that Rk is inputing a time-series that describes
the positions of atoms in a crystal. Because of geometric regularity of a
crystal, ♯(Rk) is going to be quite small. To see this explicitly, we consider a
time-series
T = {−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 1, . . .}
Here there is only one block of data {−1, 0, 1} and T is constructed by
”repeating” this block indefinitely. Therefore, Rk will input this and output
something that would say ”regular”. In the Wolfram classifcation, Class I
and Class II ECAs are algorithmically compressible while Class III and Class
IV are very dramatically not4. We see that algorithmic complexity allows
us to answer the question we raised in the Section 2.1 in a limited way–
since Rk is assumed to be performed on a universal Turing machine, and all
universal computers are equivalent to each other, one way to classify ECAs
would be to look at the compressibility of any ECA with respect to a given
compression algorithm.
Wolfram goes on to suggest something much stronger about these issues;
He calls it the Principle of Computational Irreducibility (PCI). PCI asserts
that if the length of Rk is the same as the description of T , then dynam-
ical evolution of Oi is, itself, a computation of the same length. He also
conjectures that all Class III and Class IV ECAs are universal computers
(universal Turing machines). Both of these taken together imply that al-
most all phenomena that is ”structured” but not ’simple’ are equivalent to
universal computers!
3Class III and IV ECAs are NP-complete in the following sense: suppose one inputs
some initial string into a given ECA and lets the ECA ’run’ upto n-steps. The string at
the n-th step will not, in polynomial time, tell us what string we inputed in the beginning.
4During NKS 2003: Conference and Minicourse, Wolfram demonstrated the ineffec-
tiveness of standard compression softwares to compress Rule 30, an example of Class III
ECA. The output was longer than the input!
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2.3 The action chain
In our discussion so far, we have not really talked about the physics of the
measurement process– a meter is a physical object that interacts with the ob-
servable in order to ’spew-out’ a measurement. In classical physics, the meter
is only an inference device and the observable is given an a priori ontology.
Crutchfield terms this one-way flow of information from the observable to
the meter as the Einstein flow. On the other hand, in a quantum physical
situation, the observable does not exist (ontologically) unless there is a me-
ter that performs a measurement- by that very act, it drastically changes the
inference capacity of the observer (the uncertainty principle) and sometimes
the very ontology of the observable is changed (the Scrodinger cat paradox ).
This two-way exchange of information between an observable and a meter is
termed by Crutchfield as the Heisenberg flow. This also, famously, gives us
a definition of a meter as something capable of inducing a dynamics on the
observable that is being measured. I denote this action of the meter on the
observable by the action chain:
Oi
acts
←−−− Mj
Now, as Crutchfield argues, this situation is not exclusively seen at the
quantum level. In classical dynamical systems that are sensitively depen-
dent on the choice of intial conditions, meters become capable of inducing
dynamics on the observable in such a way that the time-series thus obtained
”reflects” both the intrinsic dynamics of the observable and the ”extrinsic”
dynamics that are imposed by the meter. Crutchfied (1994) illustrates the
essentially entangled nature of the system-under-study and the environment
in which the system is placed with a nice example:
Consider the gravitational effect of an electron at the “edge” of
the known Universe (17 billion light years) on a terrestrial game
of billiards. Assume, for simplicity, that during a given shot the
game is energy conserving over half an hour and that the balls
are hit sufficiently hard to cause a few collisions per second. The
unpredictability of the billiards’ state can be conservatively es-
timated as an information loss rate of approximately 1 bit per
second. The unncertainty caused by the existence or nonexis-
tence of the electron at the edge of the universe leads to total
unpredictability in about six minutes.
12
We reformulate this example in terms of meters. Suppose we are interested
in recording the initial conditions of a game of billiards. The observable in
question is the position of an arbitrary ball on the table. We do this using
a meter that emits a photon, hits that ball, and comes back to us, thereby
enabling us to detect the position of the ball. Now the photon will impart
a small additional momentum on that ball. This additional momentum will
change the initial condition that we are intent on observing slightly. However,
since a billiard ball is a dynamical system that is extremely sensitive to the
choice of initial conditions, this tiny change in momentum would lead to a
very different time-evolution of the position of the ball, very different from
what the system would have evolved to, had the measurement not been made.
Let us look into such systems further. Suppose we have an observable
whose dynamical behavior is dependent on the performance of a measure-
ment. The main question is the commensurability of
Oi
acts
←−−− Mj
and
Oi
input
−−−−→ Mj .
In other words, Mj detects information about the dynamics of Oi. Yet, at the
same time, it contributes to the dynamics itself. Therefore, is there a way by
which we could construct a recognition device that captures this entaglement
of the inference and action chain? Certainly, algorithmic complexity does not
help us here very much- all that Rk does (when viewed as an algorithm) is
sort Oi into one of the bins, depending upon the length of Rk; it says nothing
about the origin of the dynamics that a given observable displays. It seems
that this problem, as formulated, is intractable. In Rosen’s language (Rosen,
2001a, 2001b), this entanglement of the action and inference chain is an
example of impredicativity that distinguishes complex from simple systems.
By an impredicative (complex)system, Rosen means a system that is es-
sentially bootstrapped to the environment/meter/observer– recall that the
only way we get to construct a time-series (from which one can reconstruct
the geometry of the phase space of the observable) is by successive applica-
tion of the meter to the observable. However, this time-series is only partially
faithful to the original, nascent dynamics of the observable; it also incorpo-
rates the dynamics induced by the measurement. Crutchfield argues (as
seen from his billiard-and-electron example) that this very impredicativity
13
is what disallows us to effectively predict the behavior of most nonlinear
complex system.
In this Chapter, we have provided a very condensed review of the (inter-
linked) notions of complexity, computation and measurement and the no-
tion of inference in a context/meter dependent environment. We have seen
that algorithmic complexity theory is not likely to help us “disentagle” the
contributions of the dynamics induced by the meter on an observable from
the nascent dynamics of the observable itself. We have seen however that
algorithmic complexity theory is likely to help us in providing a universal
invariant charateristic of complex systems by which we can classify them.
In summary, this charateristic is the length of the algorithm that gives us
a description of a system that is complete when ”fed” a time-series that is
inferred from the observable’s dynamics.
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Chapter 3
Scale, Measurement and the
System/Subsystem Distinction
3.1 Epistemology vs. ontology
From the dicussion in the preceeding Chapter, it is clear that any theory
of coordination in a sufficiently complex system must address the problem
of measurement very seriously. We have seen in Chapter 2 the essentially
incommensurate nature of measurement when viewed as an inference chain
in contradistinction to when viewed as an action chain. A measurement,
paradoxically, is capable of limiting our inferential ability and our capacity
to predict. This is equally valid in quantum mechanical systems and classical
mechanical systems that are sensitively dependent on the initial data supplied
to them.
There is another aspect to the problem of measurement that seriously
challenges orthodoxy– the system/subsystem distinction, an understated re-
ductionist assumption, becomes unassailable because of the very nature of
the act of measurement. In this Chapter, we discuss this problem.1
1The discussion that follows is set through more conventional notions of ontology ver-
sus episetmology. However, it might be better phrased in the terminology of context-
dependence versus context independence. Context independence is essentially an ontolog-
ical assumption. Context dependence, on the other hand, is subsuming this hypothesis
in favor of the assumption that all knowledge about the world is essentially knowledge-
through-some-observer. The context independent perspective argues that our knowledge
about the world is about the things-that-are. However, when measurement is viewed as
action (the action chain of Chapter 2), all knowledge-about-the-world is infused and en-
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Like complexity, the very definition of the words system and subsystem
are hard to come by. That is what is a system, and what do we mean by
its subsystems? I wish to argue that this very question is ill-phrased; from
a non-reductionistic viewpoint the distinction is purely epistemological. The
germs of the arguments presented here can be found in Rosen (1978, 2001a,
2001b) and Turvey (2002) even though Rosen’s resolution of the issue is
somewhat different from what we would conclude. (Rosen in [?] resolves the
system/subsystem distinction into state-restricted, observable-restricted and
dynamics-restricted subsystems of a system.)
3.2 System/susbsystem dichotomy and self-
reflexivity
Consider a collection of non-elemental (non-analytic in the Hegelian sense)
units of any arbitrary sort. The constraint on this assemblage is that the ele-
ments in this collection are ”linked” via some physical interaction.(A simple
example of such a collection is a box of Helium atoms interacting with each
other via collisions and intramolecular forces.) Recall that a meter as de-
fined in Chapter 2 ”detects” a certain class of observables via an instaneous
measurement at and in a certain spacetime scale. In a sense, meters and
observables have to have a certain ”affinity” for each other for the observer
to obtain non-trivial measurements2.
If the meter is made to detect a certain class of observables via an (instan-
taneous) measurement at (and in)a certain spacetime scale, then the system
is what is specified by that class of observables. One could then impose an-
other meter on the assemblage that, say, detects another class of observables
at a larger/longer spacetime scale. The system, then, is what is specified by
that set of observables, and the previous set of observables specify the (new)
system’s subsystem(s). By indefinitely repeating this procedure, one obtains
an indefinitely large set of classes of observables, each class of observables
specifying a system. The notion of a subsystem is, then, derived from the
tangled with the very act of measurement. Therefore, the context-independent perspective
is considerably weakened.
2For example, one could stick a Geiger counter in a tub of pure water. One is likely to
get a set of 0 in T ! We could operationalize the definition of affinity between meters and
observables in the following way: we say that a meter and an observable have an affinity
for each other if and only if we obtain a set of non-zero entries in T .
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ordering of this set of classes of observables according to the spacetime scales
that the meters (which specify and are specified by the system) operate on.
Of course, what is being alluded to in the argument above is the notion
of context dependence. Depending upon the context (the space-time scale
at which the meter is operating), the definitions of what a system and its
subsystems are changes. This context-dependence of the system/subsystem
distinction is, then, a pseudodichotomy and not ontological, because the
distinction is a matter of an observer invoking a meter at a certain spacetime
scale which then limits our capacity of inference maximally (Chapter 2). If
this is the case, then in sufficiently complex systems, one should not look for
a linear causal chain between the system and its subsystems. The notion of
causality is a valid notion only in the cases where things that are being said
to be causally linked have an ontological status.
This poses two challenges, one philosophical and the other methodologi-
cal:
• The notion of explanation. Traditionally, the explanation of a phe-
nomenon in the sciences is taken to be the explication of causality
between an arbitrary number of scales of observation of a given phe-
nomenon, where one scale is seen as ”uniquely privileged” in terms of
being the residence of analytic units. If the notion of causality between
different scales, in this case between a system and its subsystems, does
not hold true any longer, then we have to replace our notion of expla-
nation accordingly. (Baas & Emmeche (1997) suggest a new notion of
explanation for complex systems that is context-dependent.)
• The pursuit of natural laws Having said that one cannot seek an expla-
nation of a phenomenon in the traditional sense of a linear causal chain
emanating from a privileged scale and tying the successive (space/time)
ordered scales together, any enterprise of scientific enquiry that is
grounded in realism is committed to the belief in an essential lawfulness
of the observed phenomena at all scales (Kugler & Turvey, 1987). Each
set of observables specifying a system at a given scale is to be lawfully
constrained by the set of observables at other scales that specify other
systems that could be subsystems of the given system. This lawfulness
should not be construed to suggest any causal connection between the
different scales.
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Chapter 4
Free Parameters and “Tight
Models”
In the last Chapter, we noted that a theory of multiscale coordination that
is not reductionistic must be based on lawful relations that cut across scales
and yet resist the temptation of ascribing a causal link between the different
scales. What we were alluding to was a search for regularities upon which
empirical science is based, and yet a regularity that cannot be ascribed to
causal relations in a heirarchical setting of scales.
Recall that in Chapter 1, we proposed two touchstones for such a theory.
One of the touchstones was that a good theory of multiscale coordination
will be such that in that theory, the deux ex machina of free parameter fine
tuning will be minimal; a popular motto among theorist and modellers is
that “with enough parameters one can fit an elephant.” So, how are we to
avoid “explaining” everything with a maximally large set of free parameters?
After all, with enough free parameters that are liable to be fine-tuned by
hand, we could build an extremely cumbersome model that “inputs” a lot of
information (i.e. allows for a lot of fine-tuning of free parameters by hand)
and “outputs” limited information about the system that is being modelled.
In order to set a tone for a discussion of these issues, we fix a definition of
a free parameter. We define a free parameter1 in a dynamical system as a
non-state variable whose values cannnot be deduced from the model itself,
and is, instead, “put in by hand” a priori way.
1synonomously, control parameters or model parameters
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For example, consider the HKB potential
V (φ) = a cosφ− b cos 2φ. (4.1)
Clearly, the values of a and b drive the dynamical layout (decides the attrac-
tors/repellors) but the value of a or b cannot be deduced from the dynamics
itself. The analogy of free parameters, as Rosen (1978) points out, is with
genotypes in biology. Genotypes specify phenotypes (analogous to the state
variables) but not the other way round.
It is astonishing how much of modelling in the natural sciences boil down
to choosing and fine-tuning free parameters by hand. For example, the Stan-
dard Model of particle physics works only when 17 free parameters (masses
of quarks, mixing angles, Planck’s constant, . . . ) are fine-tuned by hand,
i.e., they are specified by the theorists rather than specified by the theory
(Smolin, 1995). This has often been cited as the single-biggest failure of
particle physics.
In physical biology, Kugler, et.al. (1980) following a proposal by Bern-
stein proposed a set of criteria that any viable theory of coordination should
satisfy,; one of the criterion was having a minimally small set of free param-
eters. Inspite of this, all models of coordination that have been proposed
so far (mostly based on coupled oscillator models) have not been able to
effectively stop the proliferation of free parameters. In fact, in the Beek-
Peper-Daffertshoffer two-tiered model, the number of free parameters actu-
ally increase due to the addition of the ”neural substrate” dynamics to the
classical effector level dynamics.
In a sense, the problem of having a minimally small set of free parameters
is essentially a problem of finding an entailment structure for free parameters.
By that, we mean the following: Let F = {α1, α2, . . . , αk} be a set of k free
parameters: αi = f(αj) for arbitrary i, j and 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
(Masses obeying an allometric realtion in a dynamical model are obvious
examples of members of a set of entailed free parameters.) In other words,
an entailment structure for free parameters refer to a scenario where the
values of any arbitrary free parameter in the model depend upon the value
of any other free parameter in the same model thereby reducing the number
of free parameters that should be finetuned by hand to one.
One way to provide an entailment structure to the set of free parame-
ters that has been extensively discussed in the control theory literature is by
making free parameters functions of state variables (cf. Isacc, 1957). The
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problem with this approach is the following: free-parameters drive the state-
variables and determine the dynamical layout. If we let the dynamical layout
specify the value of free-parameters, we arrive at very constrained and boot-
strapped dynamics that is likely to end up with a logical circularity making
the problem intractable.
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Chapter 5
Formal Similitude and
Dynamical Similarity
In Chapter 2, 3 and 4, we have identified various problems that need to be
addressed by any candidate theory of multiscale coordination: the role of
a measurement device and its ramifications in defining a complex system,
the essentially self-reflexive nature of the system/subsystem distinction and
lastly, the problem of finding entailment structures for free parameters in
order to stop the proliferation of the same. In this Chapter, I identify one
possible candidate that seems to adhere to the two touchstones that were
set in Chapter 1. This candidate theory is based on the notion of formal
similitude, which I, following Rosen (1988), call the principle of dynamical
similarity.
5.1 Allometry
Biological arguments based on similarity and congruence of different physio-
logical scales are not new. Principally, the work of d’Arcy Thompson, (2001,
reprint) and von Holst, (1973, reprint) has shown us how to utilize notions
of structural invariance (that different layers of physiological organization
have similar structures) and morphological invariance (that there are a few
primary ’morphs’, and that all observed morphologies are results of coordi-
nate transformations of these primary morphs). In essence, in both cases,
the key notion has been that of invariance of structure and form. In more
modern guises, these ideas have taken the name of “fractal organization” of
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physiological structure. They reflect the truism that all scales of neural or-
ganization exploit mechanisms that are structurally embedded in each other
and nested together.Typically, systems that exhibit morphological invariance
and structural invariance also exhibit the phenomena of allometry.
Allometry is defined as the following: suppose one has two observables
x and y. If y = pxq, where p, q are rational numbers, then we say that
the observables are allometrically scaled. For Rosen, allometrically scaled
relations (in recent terminology, power laws), between state variables were
examples of
the ultimate synergy, . . . , [that is] manifested by totally con-
strained systems
Recall the example of the Standard Model of particle physics. As noted
before, there are 17 free parameters in the model. However, as Smolin (1995)
notes (based on the work of Dirac, Tipler and Carter), most observables at
the scale of astrophysical and cosmological processes such as ’typical’ stellar
masses obey allometric relations with respect to those free parameters, even
though there is no strict mechanistic theory that explains why this should be
the case. (Dirac termed these allometric relations the “law of large numbers”)
5.2 Formal similitude
Invariance, in another guise, has been a fundamental principle in modern
physics for a long time– recall that Einstein’s special and general relativity
are statements about the invariance of the fundamental equations of physics
under certain (covariant coordinate) transformations. However, the principle
of invariance in modern physics has been the invariance of the (mathemat-
ical) forms of the laws of physics rather than invariance of actual physical
structure, as in d’Arcy Thompson or von Holst. I term such principles of
invariance formal similitude.
In the context of biological similitude, Rosen (1978), was one of the first
people to point out the usefulness of formal similitude. He illustrated this
”principle” in the following way: within a given cell, the concentration of
chemical species xi can be described by a mass-action rate law
x˙i = fi(x1, . . . , xn) (5.1)
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where fi are determined by specific reactions between the chemical species.
Now {x1, x2, . . . , xn} are the basic observables of cell chemistry. Rosen noted
that a map ρ : {x1, x2, . . . , xn} → R is, then, also an observable. Let F =
F (xi, . . . , xn) and G = G(x1, . . . , xn) be two such observables. We can write
F˙ = Φ(F,G) and G˙ = Ψ(F,G) (5.2)
for ”appropriately chosen functions” Φ and Ψ. Notice that (5.2) has the
same form as the mass-action rate laws (5.1); they are mass-action rate laws
for the new observables F and G. For Rosen, this indicates a ”universality”
of the form of the equations that observables satisfy.
In the context of multiscale coordination, in a sense what we are after
is one canonical form of dynamical system that observables at all scales
should satisfy. This idea of formal similarity is made precise by the notion
of topological conjugacy.
5.3 Principle of dynamical similarity
Topological conjugacy is defined as follow (Smale, 1967): Let f : A→ A and
g : B → B be two maps. f and g are said to be topologically conjugate if
there exits a homeomorphism h : A → B such that f ◦ h = h ◦ g. In other
words, the following diagram commutes:
A
g
−−−→ A
h


y


yh
B
f
−−−→ B
The hypothesis that is being advanced here is the following: Let
. . .
gi−1 : Si−1 → Si−1, gi−1 = x˙i−1
gi : Si → Si, gi = x˙i
gi+1 : Si+1 → Si+1, gi+1 = x˙i+1
. . . (5.3)
be equations of motion at different scales indexed by {. . . , i− 1, i, i+ 1, . . .}
and {. . . , Si−1, Si, Si+1, . . .} be observables at scales indexed by {. . . , i −
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1, i, i + 1, . . .}. Then there exists the set of conjugacy homeomorphisms
{. . . , hi−1, hi, hi+1, . . .} across scales such that the following diagram com-
mutes:
· · ·Si−1
hi−1
−−−→ Si
hi−−−→ Si+1 · · ·
gi−1


y gi


y gi+1


y
· · ·Si−1
hi−1
−−−→ Si
hi−−−→ Si+1 · · ·
In other words, the following set of relations hold true:
. . .
gi ◦ hi−1 = hi−1 ◦ gi−1
gi+1 ◦ hi = hi ◦ gi
. . . (5.4)
This is the principle of dynamical similarity. The germ of this formulation
of the principle is to be found in Rosen (1978, 1988).
5.4 Predictions from dynamical similarity
The principle of dynamical similarity, in summary, is about homeomorphisms
between observables. Now we investigate the commensurability of this prin-
ciple with the inference chain. Recall from Chapter 3 that a meter Mj acts
on an observable Si as an inference device in the following way:
(Si
input
−−−−→ Mj)
t
output
−−−−−→ {r1, r2, . . . , rt}(:= T ).
Intuitively, a commensurate relation between this inference chain and the
principle of dynamical similarity suggests that time series obtained by Mj
from Si is going to be similar to the time series obtained by another meter
Mj+1 acting on the observable Si+1. This suggests the first testable prediction
of a theory of multiscale coordination based on the principle of dynamical
similarity: Time series obtained from the dynamics of different strata of
physiological organization are predicted to be similar to each other.1
1This intuitive notion can be formalized by the notion of a (topological) duality between
the principle of dynamical similarity and the inference chain. One can treat the principle
of dynamical similarity in (5.4) and the action chain as duals.
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One way that this could be experimentally checked in a laboratory situa-
tion is to let subjects perform a given task while the experimenter monitors
the performance of that task as well as monitors other physiological variables
that are relevant to the performance of the given task. This method can be
summarized by the following algorithm:
• Take a multiscale system that is capable of utilyzing different layers
of orgainzation in the performance of a given task. Obtain time-series
at different scales while that task is being performed Using techniques
of phase space reconstruction, one can obtain the geometries from the
time-series (Packard et.al., 1980)
• Model the reconstrutced flows in the phase spaces thus obtained with
low dimensional equations of motion for each scale.
• Examine if there is a suitable transformation by which those “recon-
structed equations of motions” into one another.
We also see that with the principle of dynamical similarity, one is able to
lawfully constrain the values of free parameters and provide an entailment
structure for the entire set of free paramters.
In order to see how the principle of dynamical similarity constraint the
behavior of free parameters, let us look into an example taken from Strogatz
(1994/2000). The logistic map (a discrete version of the Verhulst equation)
is given by
xn+1 = rxn(1− xn). (5.5)
The free parameter in the logistic map is r. The claim that we want to prove
is that the logistic map is topologically conjugate to another biologically
relevant discrete difference equation, the quadratic map,
yn+1 = y
2
n + c, (5.6)
where c is the free parameter. These maps are topological conjugate because
there exists the homeomorphism xn = −
1
r
yn +
1
2
.
We immediately see that if the quadratic map and the logistic map are
topologically conjugate (they are), then the free parameters r and c are
related as
c =
r(2− r)
4
. (5.7)
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Therefore, the principle of dynamical similarity entails the two free parame-
ters in a lawful way.
There is another auxillary testable consequence of the principle of dynam-
ical similarity. Recall that the principle states, in essence, that the dynamics
of the i-th scale ”mimics” the dynamics of the i + 1-th scale. This implies
that if one scale has a stable limit cycle dynamic, then all other scales will
inherit the same dynamical layout. On the other hand, if one scale shows
chaotic behavior, then all other scales will have chaotic dynamics.
From the perspective of multiscale coordination in movement, this has
important implications. Certain studies of the human rhythmic movement
have identified regimes of chaotic behavior experimentally. For example,
studies of COP fluctuations show a highly self-similar fractal behavior with
non-trivial Hurst exponents (Riley et.al., 1997). However, the origin of such
dynamics is unclear. If the principle of dynamical similarity holds true, then
we know that dynamics of scales “smaller” or “larger” than that of COP
fluctuations will exhibit chaotic dynamics as well. The challenge for the ex-
perimentalist is to identify these scales and demonstrate that the underlying
dynamics have precisely the same behavior as that of the COP fluctuation
scale. On the other hand, if certain tasks at an effector level are seen to have
a stable dynamical behavior, then all other scales are likely to have the same
”structural stability” (Smale, 1967).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this Project, we examined a number of cognate issues that, taken together,
pertain to the creation of a non-reductionistic theory of multiscale coordi-
nation. Being primarily an investigation into the philosophy of theoretical
biology and physics, I have not attempted to present any particular model of
a given phenomenom. I have, instead, attempted to sketch, in broad strokes,
what a viable model should look like and the particulars it must address.
I began in Chapter 1 by addressing the two main reasons why one should
look for models of multiscale coordination: the observed stochasticity of
motor control and Wilson’s principle of evolutionary holism. We presented
two touchstones that a theory of nonreductionistic multiscale coordination
must satisfy: (1) the role of measurement in such systems must be more
than marginal and the system/subsystem distinction has to be addressed as
an epistemological rather than an ontological problem; (2) the number of free
parameters must be minimally small but maximally entailed.
Chapter 2 addressed the issue of complexity of a given system in terms of
a new synthesis of the work of Rosen (impredicative complexity) on one hand
and the work of Wolfram, Chaitin and Crutchfield (computational complex-
ity) on the other hand. We introduced a novel notational system that enabled
us to view a meter both as an inference device as well as a machine capa-
ble of introducing dynamics on the very observable that is being measured.
Thereby, we show that the so-called inference chain and the action chain are
essentially incommensurate. This leads to the immediate consequence that
the system/subsystem distinction is not at all rigid; the measurement pro-
cess, when viewed as an action chain, interferes with the very object we are
trying to infer about as well as demonstrates the context-dependency of the
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notion of a complex system.
Chapter 3 examines the role of scale in measurement and demonstrates
that the system/subsystem distinction is essentially self-reflexive. Thereby,
we showed that a ”system” and its ”subsystems” are epistemological con-
structs. The purpose of this argument was to challenge the orthodoxy of
reductionism and models that are built on the understated assumption of
”priveleged scales”. We argued that the self-reflexive nature of the sys-
tem/subsystem distinction poses serious challenges to the notion of expla-
nation and forces us to account for lawful behavior in alternative ways.
Chapter 4 was an examination of the role of free parameters in a given
model– we argued the nessecity of obtaining entailment structures for free pa-
rameters that limit the proliferation of free parameters and thereby increase
the effectiveness of a model.
Chapter 5 was the culmination of the Project. I presented one candidate
for the theory of multiscale coordination that obeyed the principle of dynam-
ical similarity. We showed that such a theory makes two predictions each of
which is falsifiable in a laboratory situation.
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